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Abstract:
This thesis is focused on multiethnic coalitions in Africa. Specifically, it seeks to identify the
causal mechanisms at play in the formation of multiethnic coalitions and whether or not they
succeed or fall apart. It also seeks to identify whether multiethnic coalition success or failure
is related to the emergence or lack thereof, of violence. Case studies and process tracing are
the primary methods of analysis, using Kenya and Senegal as cases under the most similar
systems design. There is an examination of the actors involved in the formation of
multiethnic coalitions in both nations, why the opposition coalitions fell apart in both Kenya
and Senegal as well as the relationship between coalition failure and violence. Through this
examination, causal hypotheses have been developed that can be tested by other scholars,
thus hopefully leading to more advancements in the field of research on multiethnic coalition
formation and success.
Key words: Multiethnic coalitions, Kenya, Senegal, ethnic violence, most similar systems
design
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I.

Introduction

In African politics, ethnicity is a salient cleavage within the political spheres of nations.
In Kenyan politics, where ethnic parties dominate, this is the case. However, Senegal serves
as a unique example of a multiethnic society where ethnicity is not a salient cleavage.
Despite the differences in the salience of ethnicity, both countries have had multiethnic
coalitions following their first free and fair elections of the new millennium. Both countries
have had different levels of success with the multiethnic coalitions they have experienced,
but despite these differences the two countries have many similarities. Both the president of
Kenya and the president of Senegal were democratically elected as part of multiethnic
opposition coalitions, once elected, they each became more personalistic in their leadership
and centralized power within the executive branch of their countries. This effectively
decreased the political institutionalization of both countries. This thesis examines the
differences and similarities of what happened in both countries to try and better understand
what causal mechanisms were at play in the different success rates of the multiethnic
coalitions. The research identifies politicized ethnicity and institutionalized violence as two
causal factors of the violence in Kenya and the lack of these factors as causal factors of peace
in Senegal. Through the compilation of research and analysis of other scholarly work, this
work provides a basis upon which other scholars can further the study of ethnicity, violence
and the success of multiethnic coalition governments in African nations.
a. Research Statement
The purpose of this research is to examine multiethnic coalitions. Specifically it seeks to
identify what causal mechanisms are at play in the formation and success of multiethnic
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coalitions. Kenya and Senegal are used as case studies which are examined under the most
similar systems design. The most similar systems design is defined as follows:
Such studies are based on the belief that systems as similar as possible with respect to as
many features as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry . .
.therefore, the number of “experimental” variables, although known and still large, is
minimized . . . It is anticipated that if some important differences are found among these
otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to these differences
will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those differences alone”
(Przeworski & Teune, 170, p. 33).
The most similar systems design can be used because both Kenya and Senegal have many
similarities. Both nations underwent political and economic liberalization preceding their
alternations of executive power in the early 2000s, and both nations have seen similar rule
under the new executives that were elected. Centralized executive power and weak
institutions are also characteristics of both nations. These characteristics have been theorized
as the reason for the violence in Kenya in 2007, however, no violence erupted in Senegal
despite the existence of these same variables. Through the study of multiethnic coalitions in
Kenya and Senegal, this research proposes causal hypotheses that can be tested by other
scholars. Much study has been conducted on multiethnic coalitions, and on ethnic violence,
but there is a dearth in the comparative literature about what causal mechanisms relate
multiethnic coalition success or failure to the emergence or lack thereof, of violence.
Providing causal mechanisms that can be tested will allow others to advance the
understanding of the relationship between multiethnic coalitions and ethnic violence, which
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could help multiethnic communities and policy makers in their management of multiethnic
issues.
II.

Theory
To begin the discussion of multiethnic coalition governments in Kenya and Senegal,

one must understand the definitions of “ethnicity” and “coalitions” as understood in the
scholarly literature. As Horowitz states, “ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by
color, language and religion; it covers ‘tribes’, ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and ‘castes’ (Horowitz,
1985, p. 53). Beyond ethnicity, one must understand what the definition of ethnic salience is
that will be used throughout this research. Ethnic salience is defined as “the importance that
individuals attach to ethnicity, [as] one among several components of an identity repertoire”
(Bhavnani & Miodownik, 2009 p. 30). This means that in Kenya ethnicity is salient because
it is important to individuals as part of their identity, whereas in Senegal ethnicity is not
salient, because it does not hold a large significance as part of an individuals’ identity. The
Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science defines a coalition government as “a government
formed from ministers drawn from more than one party” (Coalition Government). This
means that multiethnic coalitions are governments made up of people from numerous
political parties and ethnicities. There are problems that arise in multiethnic states. The
classic literature on the topic states that the presence of ethnicity in the political sphere will
result in an unstable democracy (Lijphart, 1969). Ethnicity is a factor that has to be
confronted when it is an active cleavage in society. When this is the case, the consensus
among scholars is that coalition governments can mediate ethnic tensions by creating more
centrist governments that can better represent multiple ethnic groups (Lijphart, 1991).
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Ethnicity is seen as a factor that is subject to change and manipulation, although
across time, it often remains constant (Basedau, Ermann, Lay & Strohl, 2011). The effect of
ethnic diversity on society is largely determined by whether or not ethnicity becomes
politicized (Basedau et al., 2011; Eifert, Miguel & Posner, 2010; Chandra, 2005). Therefore,
the relevance of ethnicity varies from country to country. Basedau et al. find little evidence
that ‘ethnicized’ party systems are harmful to democracy (462). As they state, there is often a
dearth in the literature explaining why ethnicity becomes politicized. Basedau et al. state that
there are three overall explanations in the literature that exist: structural explanations,
institutional explanations and historical explanations. Structural explanations look to the
makeup of the ethnic demography in a country, stating that high levels of ethnic
fractionalization hinder the politicization of ethnicity because there are too many groups to
effectively represent, while high levels of ethnic polarization help to mobilize ethnicity
because there are generally fewer groups, but with distinct views that are salient. The
institutional explanations discuss how political institutions impact the mobilization of
ethnicity, for example, party bans are created for the purpose of preventing ethnicity from
entering the political system. Lastly, historical explanations focus on if ethnicity had been
previously mobilized within a country. This explanation states that in some cases where
ethnicity becomes politicized and experiences positive results, it creates a cycle of mobilizing
along ethnic lines (Basedau et al., 2011, p. 468-469).
Other theories regarding ethnicity in the political realm focus on the role ethnicity
plays, rather than how ethnicity is mobilized. One theory is that ethnic identities in Africa are
strengthened in the presence of competitive elections, lending support to the idea that
ethnicity is salient when it is instrumental, in this case for the purpose of gaining political
6

power (Eifert et al., 2010). Similarly, the link between ethnicity and political parties has been
found to play a significant role in the management of conflict in societies because political
parties often “channel, aggregate, and express political demands,” thus, when political parties
are ethnic parties, ethnicity is an active determinant of state policy (Reilly, 2006 p. 811).
Ethnicity is often an easier cleavage to appeal to when campaigning, incentivizing politicians
to use it (Reilly, 2006; Chandra, 2005).
Politicized ethnicity is often seen as a factor that needs to be confronted, no matter
how ethnicity was mobilized. Theories of ethnic outbidding state that the politicization of
ethnic divisions gives rise to more ethnic parties (Chandra, 2005; Arriola, 2012). When
ethnic parties exist, the political elite find it advantageous to mobilize people along ethnic
lines, and citizens believe that political spoils will be channeled disproportionately to
coethnics of the politician in power (Eifert et al., 2010). This creates a zero-sum game where
gains by one politician are seen as losses for all others (Arriola, 2012). As a result, ethnic
parties are forced to outbid each other for resources and competitive politics are destroyed
(Chandra, 2005; Arriola, 2012). However, the ban of parties does not always prevent this
ethnic outbidding. Party bans in Nigeria have not prevented the high levels of ethno religious
violence the country has seen since 1999 (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2013). Chandra takes it a
step further stating that “institutions that artificially restrict ethnic politics to a single
dimension destabilize democracy, whereas institutions that foster multiple dimensions of
ethnic identity can sustain it” (Chandra, 2005 p. 235).
Political coordination among multiethnic populations is an important factor in the
electoral process. Leonardo Arriola’s research on multiethnic populations in African states
finds that it is necessary for opposition parties to coordinate across ethnic cleavages in order
7

for electoral competition to be meaningful (2012, p. 26). However, he finds that political
parties have struggled to coordinate across ethnic lines since independence efforts first
materialized in Africa. He posits that two reasons for the difficulty in the political
coordination are the imperfect democratization of Africa and strong ethnic divisions that
fragment the opposition. Multiethnic opposition coordination should be more likely to occur
in executive elections held under the plurality system, and opposition forces should be more
likely to fragment in presidential elections held under the runoff system (Arriola, 2012 p. 46).
Arriola also looked at multiethnic coalitions in Africa. His research findings indicate
that economic and business interests have an impact on multiethnic coalitions. Where
economic liberalization occurs and business allegiances can no longer be controlled by
incumbents, multiethnic coalitions are most likely to occur. Arriola finds that coalition
building is resource intensive and clientelistic in nature, because politicians must purchase
support from other politicians to gain a large enough voter base. However, politicians
generally have a high incentive to run independently rather than in a coordinated opposition
effort because they cannot guarantee the pre-election share of spoils that are promised once
they are in office (Arriola, 2012, p. 46).
Building off of the work of Leonardo Arriola, Kenya and Senegal are two subSaharan African countries that have had multiethnic coalitions (Arriola, 2012). While Arriola
discusses when multiethnic coalitions are likely to occur and the coordination efforts of the
opposition, there is room to expand on why multiethnic coalitions experience such stark
differences in their success rates. In Kenya, extreme violence erupted after the election
following a multiethnic coalition failure, while in Senegal, peace was maintained even
though the multiethnic coalition fell apart.
8

Kenya and Senegal can be used under the most similar systems design because of
their similarities. Both countries underwent political and economic liberalization before the
shift from de-facto one party rule to multipartyism, and eventually the alternation of power11
(regarding Kenya: Mueller, 2001; Orvis, 2001; Thioub, Dioup, & Boone, 1998; regarding
Senegal: Hartmann, 2010; Galvan, 2009). In the 1980s there were 240 State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) in Kenya, and by 2005 this number had dwindled to 108 SOEs,
decreasing by 45%. In Senegal in the same time frame, there was a decline from 87 SOEs in
the 1980s to 50 SOEs in 2005, resulting in a 57% decrease in total SOEs (Pitcher, 2012).
The eventual move toward greater democracy through the alternance of executive
power occurred within the same general time frame for both countries. For Kenya this
occurred in the presidential election of 2002 (Githongo, 2010; Barkan, 2004; Steeves, 2006)
and for Senegal, this shift in regime type occurred in the presidential election of 2000
(Vengroff & Magala, 2001; Wittman, 2008; Galvan, 2009; Kuenzi, 2011).
III.

Cases
a. Kenya

Ethnicity is a highly salient cleavage in Kenyan politics. Political leadership is based on
ethnic identity, and those who become political leaders are expected to serve their ethnic
communities, which results in a zero sum game for those involved (Steeves, 2007, Mueller,
2011). The Kikuyu are approximately 22 per cent of the total population, the Luhya are 14
per cent, Luo are 13 per cent, Kalenjin are 12 per cent and the Kamba are 11 per cent of the
1

The basis for stating that Kenya and Senegal underwent economic liberalization comes from the
work of Leonardo Arriola.
Arriola, L. R. (2012). Multi-ethnic coalitions in Africa: Business financing of opposition election
campaigns. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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total population (Klopp & Kamungi, 2007). There are 42 ethnic groups in Kenya, but Posner
(2004) developed a method of counting politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG), in which
ethnic groups that affect the economic policies and the rate of economic growth are the only
groups to be counted. By the (PREG) measurement, Kenya has a political fractionalization
score of 0.57 using the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups. However, under the more
traditional BAH measurement calculated from Morrison et al. (1989), Kenya has an ethnic
fractionalization score of 0.73 (Posner, 2004).
When Kenya gained independence from British colonial rule in 1963, the first elections
occurred. The first presidential election was between Jomo Kenyatta of the Kenyan African
National Union (KANU), and Daniel arap Moi of the Kenyan African Democratic Union
(KADU). KANU was predominantly representative of the Luo and Kikuyu people, the latter
of which had been favored under colonialism. KADU thus formed as a coalition of smaller
ethnic groups in opposition to continued Kikuyu rule. However, when KANU won the
elections, KADU integrated into KANU to share in the spoils of power. Under this
integration, Moi took the Vice Presidential position under President Kenyatta (Orvis, 2001).
The country prospered under Kenyatta’s rule, however, he continued to concentrate
prosperity among his ethnic group, the Kikuyu, as had been done under British rule. Kenyatta
ruled until his death in 1978, when Moi succeeded him, bringing a different method of rule to
the country (Barkan, 2004).
President Moi, previously of the KADU, sought to finally redress the favoring of the
Kikuyu people. His aim was to shift the political favor from the Kikuyu to his Kalenjin
people of the Rift Valley (Barkan, 2004). Moi did not follow the ‘gentle’ authoritarianism of
Kenyatta. Following a failed coup attempt in 1982, Moi’s leadership became more repressive
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(Barkan, 2004; Steeves, 2006). Despite his repressive tactics, Moi was forced to liberalize the
political system, at least on paper, which he did by removing the 2(a) clause of the
Constitution in 1992, which had made Kenya a de facto one party state (Mueller, 2011;
Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2006). Multipartyism resulted in the creation of more political parties
because it allowed ethnic groups the chance to compete for the political power they had
always been denied. However, while Moi allowed multipartyism, he did all in his power to
prevent the end of one-party rule by using repression. Part of this repressive ruling style was
utilizing political and economic statism to guarantee that opposition to KANU rule was putdown (Mueller, 2011; Barkan, 2004). Moi did follow one trend of leadership from Kenyatta,
which was weakening government institutions outside of the executive. This method gave the
executive more power, making it easier to combat any opposition forces (Mueller, 2011).
In the presidential election of 1992, the first legal opposition forces to Moi and KANU
rule emerged. The initial opposition party was the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
(FORD) which initially united Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya leaders (Orvis, 2001; Kagwanja,
2005). A second opposition party was formed by a former Vice President under Moi, Mwai
Kibaki. Kibaki, of the Kikuyu people, formed the Democratic Party (DP) (Orvis, 2001;
Barkan, 2004; Steeves, 2006). FORD fragmented into two parties because of a disagreement
between Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba over who would be the party candidate for
president. This lead to the formation of FORD-Kenya under Odinga, which represented
primarily the Luo community and a section of the Luhya people. Under Matiba, FORD-Asili
was formed to represent Kikuyu (Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2006; Kagwanja, 2005). The regime
initiated violence against the opposition during the time leading up to the 1992 election. Such
violence was used to detract the focus from uniting under Anti-Moi and Anti-Kikuyu banners
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(Steeves, 2006). The opposition separated the vote between the DP, FORD-Kenya and
FORD-Asili. This failure to unite under a single slate of candidates resulted in Moi winning a
plurality of the vote. The fragmentation of the parties was seen in the vote tallies, which were
split along the ethnic lines that the parties represented (Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2006).
Moi won the 1997 election in a similar manner as he had won the 1992 elections. Slight
improvements occurred between the 1992 and 1997 elections, such as the Electoral
Commission of Kenya allowing an equal number of opposition appointees to preside over
elections. Additionally, the requirement that parties apply for and receive approval to hold
rallies and public meetings was abolished, allowing for a more liberalized political scene—at
least on paper. The same opposition parties were around for the 1997 election, however,
FORD-Asili perished without the leadership of Matiba, who was unhappy that no substantial
constitutional reforms had taken place. FORD-Kenya further fragmented when Oginga
Odinga died. Michael Wamalwa, of the Abaluhya ethnic group, replaced Odinga as leader of
FORD-Kenya. However, Raila Odinga, the son of Oginga Odinga, left the party to chair the
National Development Party (NDP). Kibaki continued to run under the DP. The Social
Democratic Party (SDP) was a new party to join the opposition, led by Charity Ngilu of the
Kamba people (Steeves, 2006). The continued inability of the opposition to unite under a
single slate of candidates resulted in Moi winning the 1997 election (Barkan, 2004).
Moi continued his reign through the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections by suppressing
opposition forces. KANU senior officials assisted Moi in doing everything they could to
“divide, harass, and intimidate opposition forces” within civil society and in politics (Steeves
2007, p. 213). The opposition forces rallied along ethnic lines, competing for public
resources for the ethnic groups they represented (Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2007). Due to the
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ethnic focus of Moi’s regime and the opposition, Moi intentionally created violent ethnic
clashes within the Rift Valley before and during the presidential elections. One method of
suppressing the opposition was the intentional creation of ethnic clashes, using ‘Kalenjin
warriors’ to kill opposition voters and members of other ethnic groups in the Rift Valley
before and during both presidential elections of the 1990s (Mueller, 2011; Steeves, 2006).
However, Moi was forced to seek the support of opposition forces after the 1997 elections
because KANU did not have enough power to be effective in government, due to the
shrinking presence of his party in government. Odinga of the NDP party and Luo people,
formally merged with KANU in 2002 to create the New-KANU. Moi created four new chair
positions all held by different ethnic leaders, of the Abaluhya, Kamba, Mijikenda and Kikuyu
ethnic groups (Steeves, 2006).
The formation of a multiethnic coalition before the 2002 elections did not result in a win
for the New KANU party, as Moi had planned. Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC) was elected as the third president of Kenya (Barkan, 2004). NARC was a
coalition of coalitions, the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP). The NAK formed five months prior to the 2002 election. It joined Kibaki’s DP
with a dozen other ethno-regional parties, including the Meru and Embu (close relation to the
Kikuyu), the Abaluhya who supported Wamalwa and the Kamba people who supported
Ngilu (Steeves, 2006; Barkan, 2004). Moi handpicked his successor, Uhuru Kenyatta without
consulting the New KANU party, which fragmented the party. Odinga and other upset New
KANU members formed the Rainbow Alliance, requesting that there be an open and fair
convention to choose the presidential candidate. Moi could not reign in the Rainbow Alliance
because he would not remove Kenyatta as his candidate, resulting in the Rainbow Alliance
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joining the LDP (Steeves, 2006).The LDP formed ten weeks prior to the elections, with
Odinga’s support (Barkan, 2004). The NAK and LDP came together on October 22, 2002
after signing a Memorandum of Understanding that power would be equally distributed
between the two parties in government, and agreeing that Kibaki would serve as the
presidential candidate (Steeves, 2006, Barkan, 2004). In this election, the opposition rallied
around a single slate of candidates, resulting in its success in electing Kibaki as president
(Barkan, 2004).
Despite the success of forming a coalition government for the first time in Kenya, in the
first free and fair elections in the country’s history, the success of the multiethnic coalition
was short-lived (Githongo, 2010; Steeves, 2006). Kibaki abandoned the Memorandum of
Understanding between the NAK and LDP, eliminating the power of the LDP (Khadiagala,
2010). Kibaki began to promote ethnic hysteria and allowed his lieutenants to issue warnings
of the dangers of a Luo-led country. This weakened public trust in the government. What
followed was the formation of Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which was a
union of those opposed to the president and his allies (Khadiagala, 2010; Githongo, 2010).
The ODM further inflamed ethnic passions, to which the president retaliated. The language
between minority ethnic groups against the president and his Kikuyu people was similar to
that before the Rwandan genocide, describing outsiders as ‘spots’ needing to be cleaned
(Githongo, 2010, p. 3). This preceded the 2007 presidential elections and resulted in intense
ethnic violence (Mueller, 2011 elections).
After the failure of the 2002 coalition, no successful coalition was formed in 2007.
Kibaki defeated Odinga’s ODM in the 2007 presidential elections, resulting in an eruption of
violence. The results of the election were not seen as legitimate by ODM supporters because
14

the numbers were very close and came after pressure was placed on the Electoral
Commission of Kenya to provide a winner (Cheeseman, 2008). Gang violence erupted, and
politicians called on their own ethnic youth to fight (Githongo, 2010; Kagwanja 2005). One
theory is that gang violence became institutionalized during Moi’s regime, when he practiced
ethnic violence, leaving the gangs waiting to be tapped (Mueller, 2011). Despite the fact that
politicians from both sides were implicated in the violence, they have remained in power,
suggesting that ethnic violence has become an accepted part of the political process
(Githongo, 2010; Mueller, 2011). There are multiple theories on why violence erupted after
the 2007 election, but most focus on the centralized power of the presidency, the weakening
of institutions, political parties driven by ethnicity and the decline of the state’s monopoly
over resources (Mueller, 2011; Githongo, 2010; Cheeseman 2008).
Kenya had once been known as the bulwark of stability within Africa, as an “island of
peace” and “one of the foremost maturing democracies on the continent,” all of which
immediately came to an end with the violence of 2008 (Juma 2009, p. 411). Due to the
violent nature of the conflict, and the fact that Kenya had once been an example of African
success in maintaining peace and democratizing, the 2008 post-election violence received
much international attention. President Kibaki and his administration did not look kindly
upon western interests getting involved in efforts to end the violence, but would accept
African intervention. The African Union (AU) intervention that occurred “‘protected’ Kenya
from being ‘hijacked’ by international agendas, shrinking a fear across the country and most
specifically within the Kibaki administration of Western powers (viewed as spoilers) that
were intent on bringing his administration down.” (Juma, 2009, p. 415). The intervention
occurred swiftly, which is remarkable considering there were not specific guidelines in place
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for how the AU should manage internal conflicts within countries, and the entire process was
determined on an ad-hoc basis. The intervention of individual peace-keepers from other
African states was also timely. Notably, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa arrived
in Kenya three days after the violence began. While he came for the All-African Conference
of Churches, he urged church and political leaders to work together to end the violence, and
while he was unwelcome, he set the stage for other influential leaders from Africa and the
west to enter the country for peace talks (Juma, 2009, p. 412).
The AU was ultimately the main body that mediated and ended the post-election
violence in Kenya. As chair of the AU, former president of Ghana, John Kufuor selected
Kofi Annan to lead the mediation in Kenya (Juma, 2009; Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009).
Annan had extensive experience in politics and negotiation, making him an “inspired choice”
as described by Margaret Vogt, Deputy Director of Africa I Division within the UN
Department of Political Affairs (Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009). Civil society was vital to the
efforts to end the violence in Kenya; women’s groups, religious leaders and concerned
citizens all joined together to try and stop the bloodshed on local levels (Juma 2009;
Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009). Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga both met with Annan as part
of the mediation process.
The final solution was a grand coalition between Kibaki and Odinga, where Kibaki
maintained his position as president and Odinga sat as Prime Minister. Annan unveiled this
idea in front of the Kenyan legislature on February 11, 2008 and it was put into place shortly
thereafter on February 28, 2008 when both parties signed an agreement to coalesce. Before
signing the agreement, a meeting between Annan and the leaders took place. In order to
ensure that the position of Prime Minister would maintain its authority, there was a need to
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revise the constitution. Kibaki wanted to maintain the current structure of the constitution,
but this was impossible. Eventually, there was an agreement made on how to amend the
constitution, and “when they emerged from this meeting, they were ready to sign an
‘agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ (Baldur 2008b).
This paved the way for the promulgation of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act
(Government of Kenya 2008; Annan, signing event, Nairobi, 28 February 2008)” (Juma,
2009). This Act would be the final step in solidifying the coalition between the two
politicians, and ending the ethnic violence.
However, the agreement was problematic because it was forced by peacekeepers. Outside
international actors from the AU had created the coalition between Kibaki and Odinga, the
two had not agreed to be peaceful on their own. As such, the Kenyan people did not trust the
government coalition, and policy making was difficult to attain (Githongo, 2010). Despite the
“success” of the government, the people of Kenya did not approve of the coalition (Bratton &
Kimenyi, 2008). A general lack of trust and legitimacy in the government resulted in a lack
of an effective opposition coalition formation in 2013, when Uhuru Kenyatta won the
presidential election. Odinga contested the results of the election because he said rigging and
technical problems had occurred. As such, he took the case to the Kenyan Supreme Court,
where they upheld Kibaki’s win. After the ruling, Odinga conceded defeat and asked the
people to accept the results (“Kenya court upholds Uhuru Kenyatta's poll win”).
b. Senegal
Senegal is a multiethnic society. The Wolof comprise 43 per cent of the population, the
Serer 15 per cent, the Fulbe 14 per cent, the Halpulaar 9 per cent, Jola 5 per cent and others
comprise 14 per cent of the total population (Kuenzi, 2011). The Wolof group is the largest
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and dominates in economic and political life, however, ethnicity is not a salient issue
(Bossuroy, 2011; Kuenzi, 2011). By Posner’s politically relevant ethnic group (PREG)
measurement, which measures ethnic groups that affect the economic policies and the rate of
economic growth, Senegal has a score of 0.14 (Posner, 2004). However, most literature
considers the five major ethnic communities. Following this more classic approach, the BAH
measurement calculated for Morrison et al. (1989) has an ethnic fractionalization score of
0.71. This is extremely close to Kenya’s score using the same measurement, of 0.73. Since
independence in 1960, ethnic relationships have been peaceful between these five
communities (Hartmann, 2010; Galvan, 2001). Despite the relative ethnic peace, there has
been a secessionist movement in the southern Casamance region, comprised of the Jola
ethnic group. This is most likely due to the fact that the geographic makeup of the country
separates the southern region from the bulk of the country, resulting in the Jola ethnic group
being excluded from the networks that peacefully connect the other ethnic groups (Kuenzi,
2011).
Senegal has a vibrant civil society, which has existed since colonial times (Resnick,
2013; Gellar, 2005). There is a prevalence of cross-cutting cleavages and a political culture
of blurred roles between political and religious actors (Wittmann, 2008; Hartmann, 2010;
Kuenzi, 2011). One argument for why ethnicity has not been a salient issue in Senegal is that
the parties are culturally embedded and the existing social capital prevents the tendency of
elites to play the ethnic card (Galvan, 2001). Yet another theory for why ethnicity is not a
salient cleavage is that party bans have been effective in limiting the politicization of
ethnicity. However, it seems more likely that the party ban provisions were indicative of the
overall political culture, showing that ethnicity was never an issue (Hartmann, 2010).
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Following independence, Leopold Sedar Seghor of the Union Progressiste Senegalais
(UPS) was elected president, and ruled from 1960 to 1980. A democratic constitution was
adopted, however Senghor did not implement the constitution properly and instead focused
on clientelistic relationships between the government and other prominent actors in society
(Wittmann, 2008). Senghor did not allow any opposition to his rule, which he ensured with
the new constitution of 1963 which created a de-facto one party state and essentially a
presidential plurality system (Hartmann, 2010; Resnick, 2013). In 1976, external pressures
from the world economic crisis resulted in the reestablishment of multiparty rule. Senghor
created a three party system, and the UPS became the Parti Socialiste (SP) (Hartmann, 2010;
Wittmann, 2008; Kuenzi, 2011). Abdou Diouf succeeded Seghor and continued the path of
liberalization.
Ruling from 1981-2000, Diouf made many adjustments to the regime. He eliminated the
three-party restriction of 1976, which resulted in a competitive multiparty system (Galvan,
2009; Hartmann, 2010; Resnick, 2013). Economic liberalization also prospered under Diouf
in a way that was unseen under Senghor. There was a move away from business groups
implementing government policy through the private sector, and thus, away from clienteliststyle relations between businesses and the state. However, this was not all positive. The
result was the fragmentation of the political and economic elite, creating a situation where
both state and business actors had to fight for access to state resources to protect their
interests (Thioub et al., 1998). Rather than having opposition parties based on ideological
grassroots support, many actors in Senegal’s opposition parties use these parties as vehicles
for power, resulting in the voluntary forming and breaking of alliances when convenient
(Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001).
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Since Senghor’s rule, the relationship among political and religious elite has been a
notable part of political culture. When Senghor was in power, the dominance of the UPS
which would become the SP in 1976, was due to efforts to build coalitions with the country’s
Sufi Muslim brotherhoods. These Sufi Muslim brotherhoods were the most legitimate and
popular social organizations in the country (Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001). Beyond this, the
political elite were forced to arrange electoral contracts with the marabouts (religious leaders)
of the Muslim brotherhoods. These contracts were called ndigels and resulted in the
marabouts telling their followers which political candidates to vote for (Wittman, 2008;
Hartmann, 2010). So, while ethnicity was never salient in Senegal, civil society in the form
of religion has played an important role in the political process, while still keeping the
country secular.
In 2000, Senegal achieved its first legitimate alternation of power, with the election of
Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (SDP) (Wittmann, 2008; Galvan,
2009; Kuenzi, 2011). In 1998, opposition parties began to break off from the SP, with the
formation of the Union poir le Renouveau (URD), led by Djibo Ka, who had previously been
a prominent actor in the SP. The former prime minister of the SP, Moustapha Niasse formed
the Alliance des Forces de Progres (AFP), in 1999 (Hartmann, 2010). Ka and Niasse shifted
their support to back Wade in the 2000 election under the understanding that Niasse would
be prime minister and Ka would be given a ministerial position, however Ka backed the SP
party in the second round. These two—before Ka defected to the SP—were part of a larger
coalition of nearly 40 parties, which ran on the slogan of SOPI (meaning ‘change’ in Wolof).
Before the first round of the presidential election, nearly all candidates had reached an
agreement stating that they would back whomever moved on to the second round of the
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election. In the first round, Diouf gained 41 per cent of the vote, and Wade gained 31 per
cent of the vote, moving both of them to the second round (Vengroff and Magala, 2011). Part
of what united the opposition was that the SP had evolved into a patronage machine despite
the liberalization efforts under Diouf (Galvan, 2009). One theory is that Diouf created the
necessary elements to allow the opposition to win with his liberalization efforts. Specifically,
Diouf’s acceptance of the liberalization of media was to his downfall because it allowed for
investigative journalism. Investigative journalism showed the flaws of the Diouf regime and
forced the transparency of the ballot (Wittmann, 2008).
In 2007, Wade won the presidential election again, however, he was not backed by a
coalition this time around. Wade moved away from his promise to further liberalize the
nation and instead focused his efforts on personalized rule. Such acts as centralizing the
power of the executive, bullying the press and briefly supporting an anti-Catholic movement,
were seen by the citizenry as traits which they looked to remove from the executive office.
President Wade was very paranoid about opposition to his rule, as such, he went through five
prime ministers, and he arrested one man who was his presumed successor (Galvan, 2009;
Resnick, 2013). Despite the perceived problems with his rule, Wade won the election with 55
per cent of the vote, defeating fourteen rivals (Galan, 2009; Hartmann, 2010).
The 2012 presidential election saw the reformulation of an opposition coalition, through
which Macky Sall beat Wade to become president (“Senegal's President-elect Macky Sall
hails 'new era'”; “Senegal's president concedes defeat in runoff election”). There was civil
unrest before the elections due to Wade’s decision to run for a third term despite the new
constitutional amendment which limited the presidential term to two successive terms. Wade
said that because the amendment was created while he was in power in his first term, the first
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term did not fall under this limitation (Resnick, 2013). Surprisingly, after his loss, Wade
requested that the people of Senegal respect the election results, and conceded defeat
(“Senegal's President-elect Macky Sall hails 'new era'”; “Senegal's president concedes defeat
in runoff election”). The coalition opposition included twelve individual candidates. Sall ran
under the party he founded in 2008, the Alliance for the Republic (APR). Wade ran on the
PDS ticket as part of a coalition known as the Allied Forces (FAL) 2012. When Sall received
enough votes to move to the second round of voting, all of the main opposition parties rallied
behind him and formed the Benno Bok Yakaar (BBY) coalition, which translates to
‘Together We Share the Same Hope.’ The ability of the BBY to form a coalition shows the
high volatility of electoral voting, which some see as a problem for the political
institutionalization of Senegal (Resnick, 2013).
IV.

Research Questions

The following research questions are investigated in order to identify the causal
mechanisms at play in the success and failure of multiethnic coalition formation.
Additionally, the last question looks to identify the causal mechanisms involved in the
emergence of ethnic violence or the continuation of peace.
1. Why were the opposition coalitions able to unify in the presidential elections of both
Senegal in 2000 and Kenya in 2002?
2. Why did the multiethnic coalitions fall apart in both countries?
3. Why did the election of 2007 result in violence in Kenya and not Senegal?
V.

Methods
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Using Kenya and Senegal as case studies, an analysis of each country’s presidential
elections was conducted. The analysis of Kenya focuses on the presidential elections of 2002,
2007 and 2013, while the analysis of Senegal focuses on the presidential elections of 2000,
2007 and 2012. Case studies are used because they “are essential for description, and are
therefore, fundamental to social science. It is pointless to seek to explain what we have not
described with a reasonable degree of precision” (King, Keohane & Verba, 2004).
Additionally, case studies are the preferred method when examining contemporary events in
which the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated (Yin, 2003). By examining in-depth case
studies causal hypotheses can be created (King et al, 2004). While case studies are good for
creating causal hypotheses, process tracing is used as a complimentary method in order to
gain insight into causal mechanisms at work (Collier, 2012). Process tracing is defined as “an
analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of
evidence” (Collier, 2012). Using this method allows for the opportunity to closely examine
the presidential elections in Kenya and Senegal and look for and examine causal mechanisms
in the formation of multiethnic coalitions, the success of multiethnic coalitions and the
inability to form opposition multiethnic coalitions.
Data collection used for analysis consisted of secondary and primary sources from
scholarly articles, books, newspapers and surveys. Although these sources included pertinent
quantitative data, such as charts on party polarization and the effective number of parties, the
focus is primarily qualitative in nature. Primary and secondary sources were acquired
through the use of scholarly journals and databases such as JSTOR, Academic Search
Premier, Sage, the New York Times and Afrobarometer.
VI.

Research Findings
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a) Why were the opposition coalitions able to unify in both Senegal and Kenya in the 2000
and 2002 presidential elections?
Multiethnic Coalition in Kenya
The political climate of Kenya leading up to the 2002 presidential election created an
optimal climate for a unified opposition coalition. The combined effects of the declining
power of the ruling party, liberalization and fluid politics where politicians lack strong
ideological identities and easily switch parties in order to gain power, led to the formation of
the multiethnic coalition government in Kenya in 2002.
Before liberalization, President Daniel arap Moi had been in complete control of state
resources, allowing him to partake in clientelism at his will (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006).
However, as Kenya liberalized economically, President Moi lost his control over state
finances, which was one of the reasons that he did not want to participate in liberalization
efforts. While the need for IFI loans forced Moi to liberalize, the process of liberalization still
occurred with great hesitation (Pitcher, 2012). Economic liberalization paved the way for
business interests to become politically active as the state was pushed out of the economic
sphere. Business leaders had an increasing propensity for funding coalition parties, as they
knew that there was an actual chance for success. These business leaders took particular
interest in opposition parties that they knew could influence policies important to their
economic interests if the opposition won. Arriola argues that opposition politicians are more
likely to form multiethnic coalitions for executive office where incumbents have been forced
to relinquish the state’s historic control over capital (2013; 242). The effects of economic
liberalization changed the political climate of Kenya (Arriola, 2012).
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As economic liberalization changed the political climate in favor of opposition parties,
KANU was facing these realities in terms of political strength. Following the 1997 elections,
Moi and the KANU party started losing power due to parliamentary losses, which forced Moi
to re-examine his political strategy (Elischer, 2008). President Moi realized that in order to be
competitive in the 2002 elections, his party would require a larger multiethnic voter base. In
order to create such a voter base, Moi’s KANU party formally merged with Odinga’s NDP
party with a base of Luo support, to create the New-KANU. Moi created four new chair
positions all held by different ethnic leaders, of the Abaluhya, Kamba, Mijikenda and Kikuyu
ethnic groups. Moi’s new party with a broader ethnic base alerted opposition leaders that
they would also have to join together to create a larger voter base in order to be competitive
against New-KANU (Steeves, 2006; Khadiagala, 2010).
While New-KANU had created a more ethnically diverse party, problems arose
within the party itself that threatened its success in the 2002 presidential election. Moi could
not continue his reign as president due to the two-term presidential limit, so it was clear there
would be a need for a different presidential candidate. Odinga announced that he would like
to nominate himself as the party candidate (Steeves, 2006). However, shortly following this,
Moi personally hand-picked Uhuru Kenyatta as the presidential candidate to continue his
reign (Steeves, 2007; Steeves, 2006). Uhuru Kenyatta was Kikuyu, and at the latest moment
constitutionally allowed, Moi picked Musalia Mudavadi who was Luhya as the vicepresidential candidate. It was clear that Moi was attempting to create a multi-ethnic party
simply to gain votes and maintain the power of KANU (Elischer, 2008). Despite Moi’s
political maneuvering to maintain power, other members disagreed with his methods, which
created a faction within the party.
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Moi’s choice of Kenyatta as the presidential candidate was ultimately the end of the
New-KANU. Raila Odinga, of the previous NDP party that had joined with KANU to form
New-KANU, was named as Secretary General of the new party. He led the faction group
within New-KANU after Kenyatta was chosen by Moi (Elishcer, 2008). The opposition
group within the party was called the Rainbow Alliance, and toured Kenya telling of how
they were upset over the lack of an open convention for determining the presidential
candidate. There were chants of “All is possible without Moi” (Steeves, 2006: 201). The
Rainbow Alliance could not be reined in by Moi, and broke from New-KANU to form the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under Raila Odinga’s leadership (Elischer, 2008; Steeves,
2006). This splinter party from New-KANU severely weakened KANU and as well as the
opposition. The opposition, which had already seen the need to create a multiethnic coalition
because of New-KANU joining the NDP, now saw a great opportunity to join together. The
opposition created the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) which joined Kibaki’s DP with
Michael Wamalwa of FORD-Kenya and Charity Ngilu of the National Party of Kenya (NPK)
(Elischer, 2008; Steeves, 2006). Kibaki brought Kikuyu support, along with Meru and Embu
community support, Wamalwa shared split support of the Abaluhya people and Ngilu also
shared some support of the Kamba people (Steeves, 2006).
Ultimately, Odinga’s splinter party joined with the opposition coalition, creating a
coalition of the LDP and NAK. The two came together as the National Rainbow Coalition on
October 22, 2002 after signing a Memorandum of Understanding that power would be
equally distributed between the two parties in government, and agreeing that Kibaki would
serve as the presidential candidate (Steeves, 2006, Barkan, 2004). Following the Rainbow
Coalition’s defection from KANU, senior political members seemed content to surrender
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power. In the presidential elections of the 1990s, President Moi and the KANU party had
taken part in political actions to ensure victory, including bribing, intimidating voters and
using state finances to fund anything necessary to win the elections. While some bribing and
voter intimidation did take place, it was on a miniscule scale compared to previous efforts,
and the party did not spend a large amount to finance Kenyatta’s election. Moi was expected
to fund Kenyatta out of his own pocket, but this did not happen, and the Kenyatta family
funded most of the campaign (Barkan, 2011). It seemed as though President Moi and KANU
politicians were conceding defeat considering the demise of their multiethnic coalition which
would clearly mean a lack of votes.
In addition to the economic liberalization that allowed for the formation of the National
Rainbow Alliance, there was another central characteristic of Kenyan politics that
encouraged the creation of a multiethnic opposition coalition. In 2002, the ‘unbounded
politics’ of Kenya allowed for the coming together of multiple ethnic groups and politicians.
Unbounded politics is defined as the process under which “the big men of politics shift
allegiances, parties and coalitions quickly when to do so is in their and their community’s
advantage” (Steeves, 2006: 197). Each of the major political leaders before the 2002
presidential election took part in unbounded politics. Even President Moi took part in
unbounded politics by trying to form a multiethnic party simply with the goal of maintaining
his own power.
However, the opposition took unbounded politics to the extreme. The major opposition
leaders each maintained their own parties in 1992 and 1997, and thus lost by fragmenting the
vote share. Leading up to the 2002 presidential election the opposition leaders saw that it
would be in everyone’s best interest to combine and gain all of the votes for the opposition
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under one party title. The lack of strong ideological or policy preferences by the party leaders
resulted in their ability to participate in unbounded politics and continue the trend of forming
new opposition parties that had begun with the emergence of multipartyism (Resnick, 2013).
The simple desire for power that drives unbounded politics could be seen in the case of
Wamalwa who did not think that Kibaki should be the presidential candidate because it
would put another Kikuyu in power, he believed that it was time for another ethnic group,
preferably his own ethnic group under his own leadership to take the glory. However, Kibaki
had an inner circle of twenty prominent businessmen financing his efforts to win, meaning
Kibaki had money to spare in his efforts to convince Wamalwa that he should be the
presidential candidate. Once given an upfront payment, Wamalwa agreed to support Kibaki
as the presidential candidate of the opposition, with the agreement that he would take the
position of Vice President (Arriola, 2013). This example shows that power is the main goal
of Kenyan politicians. Because of how unbounded politics works, however, anything that
helps advance a politician’s self-interest will be supported. Wamalwa was set on the idea of
himself being the presidential candidate and ending the long-trend of Kikuyu executive
power, but due to his flexible politics he easily joined his competitor for a financial gain in
addition to a share of power.
In the end, the National Rainbow Coalition was able to come together and Kibaki was
able to win the presidential election with 15 parties in total supporting the opposition
(Ndewga 2003). The NARC was successful enough to win the necessary 25% of the vote in
all eight provincial regions to win the executive race. Notably, KANU did not even win in
regions in which it was expected to thrive, such as the rural coastal region. In this region
there had been a formation of opposition politicians on the parliamentary ticket in 1997 in
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order to please supporters of a violent anti-KANU outbreak (Barkan, 2011). As part of the
NARC, Charity Ngilu, Michael Wamalwa, Mwai Kabaki and Raila Odinga collectively
represented the Kamba, Abaluhya, Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups (Steeves, 2006). By
combining these major ethnic groups as well as the ethnic groups of the smaller supporting
parties, the coalition formed a constituent base that was truly multiethnic in nature (Elischer,
2008). The combined influence of economic liberalization which caused KANU’s power
decline, along with the unbounded politics of the Kenyan system, allowed the multiethnic
coalition to coalesce.

Multiethnic Coalition in Senegal
Senegal has a unique situation because while it is deemed a multiethnic society, ethnicity
is not a salient political cleavage. Due to the societal makeup of Senegal the opposition
coalition that formed in 2000 was multiethnic in nature, however it lacked ethnic parties. The
opposition coalition was able to form due to the same factors as those that took place in
Kenya leading up to the 2002 Kenyan election. Fluid politics, economic liberalization, and
the decline of the ruling party all worked together to create the perfect environment for the
Sopi coalition to succeed.
The election of 2000 was the first democratic transition of power, and the end of Abdou
Diouf’s 19 year reign as executive (Wittman, 2008; Galvan, 2009; Kuenzi, 2011; Arriola,
2012). The importance of the opposition coalition had much more to do with the fact that the
opposition came together to defeat the long-standing ruling PS (Parti Socialiste) than the fact
that it was multiethnic, because parties are multiethnic by nature (Kuenzi, 2011). However,
Arriola still identifies Senegal as having a multiethnic opposition coalition that was able to
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unify because of economic liberalization (2012). A unique element of the liberalization
process that led to democratization in Senegal is that President Diouf openly supported both
economic and political liberalization efforts (Vengroff & Magala, 2008; Kuenzi, 2011).
Monetary freedom by business leaders was a crucial part of the economic liberalization
efforts that led to the opposition coalition winning in Senegal. Arriola discusses the
importance of opposition politicians having enough money to show the people that they are
successful and can financially back up their promises. Abdoulaye Wade was given as an
example of an opposition politician who successfully and openly flaunted his wealth
(Arriola, 2012; 40). Arriola mentions that with the money opposition candidates have, they
are able to satisfy the resource requirements of coalition bargaining, such as providing other
politicians payments for their support (2013; 316). The money that these opposition leaders,
such as Abdoulaye Wade have, comes from the liberalization of the financial sector which
removes the state from controlling the economy and businessmen. When this happens and the
states do not control the banking sector, businessmen have freedom to prosper and use their
monetary gains to fund opposition leaders who support economic interests, or become the
opposition leaders, as was the case with Wade (Arriola, 2012; Arriola, 2013).
Other elements of liberalization efforts may have also been responsible for the successful
formation of the opposition coalition in Senegal. One theory is that President Diouf’s
liberalization efforts created the necessary elements to allow the opposition to win.
Specifically, Diouf’s acceptance of the liberalization of media was to his downfall because it
allowed for investigative journalism. Investigative journalism showed the flaws of the Diouf
regime and forced the transparency of the ballot. By allowing the media to be liberalized,
Diouf “contributed to the development of civic responsibility and played a crucial role in the
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transparency of the ballot. . . [and it was through these efforts] that the opposition led by the
SDP candidate, Wade, won the elections” (Wittman, 2008: 481).
The processes that allowed for democratization to occur in Senegal also allowed for the
opposition to win as a multiethnic coalition government. Beyond media liberalization,
institutional reform was a necessary element that allowed for the opposition to thrive. Under
the reform, participation of opposition parties was encouraged to further the democratic
competition (Vengroff & Magala, 2001). Democratic competition was high amongst the
opposition, the Coalition pour l’Alternance 2000 (CA) was made up of eight parties before
the election. Abdoulaye Wade was the clear choice as presidential candidate because of his
high share of votes and his previous opposition tactics against President Diouf (Kuenzi,
2011). President Diouf attempted to have Wade join the government as the vice president, a
position which he hoped to create, following the violent election of 1988. Diouf hoped that
coopting with the opposition would ease the tension and bolster his position, but senior
members of the PS vetoed the plan. According to Arriola, one of the main reasons that the
opposition should form a coalition is to gain entrance into the government when exclusion
has taken place (2012). After the first round of elections, the Front pour l’Alternance (FAL)
comprising 21 parties was formed (Kuenzi, 2011). Ultimately, the opposition candidates
came together to support Wade and put an end to the ‘massive patronage machine’ that
Diouf’s party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), had become (Galvan, 2001).
President Diouf’s liberalization efforts to help make Senegal democratize may have been
good-natured, however, it seems as though they were an unsuccessful attempt to hold onto
power. The SP had evolved into a patronage machine long before the liberalization efforts,
and the liberalization did not end this pattern (Galvan, 2009). Over time the political climate
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shifted from strong support for the PS to an increasing interest in backing the PDS. In 1983
the PS had overwhelming popular support with nearly 84 percent of the vote, while the PDS
had only about 15 percent of the vote. By 2000, the situation had dramatically shifted. By
then, the PS’s support had dwindled to a little over 41 percent of the vote, while the PDS was
now approved by over 58 percent of the voters (Galvan, 2001). There was a trend in African
politics following the end of the cold war to liberalize because of international pressures
(Arriola, 2012). It appears from the trend of waning support for the PS over time that Diouf
was simply trying to impress international actors and keep the economy of his country afloat
with liberalization efforts. Senegal was known for having a classic clientelistic relationship
between business and the state, something that Diouf continued to try to maintain even while
liberalizing (Galvan, 2009; Arriola, 2012). The changing political climate of Senegal was not
conducive to the continued power of the PS, rather it encouraged the shift of power to
Wade’s Sopi opposition coalition.
The overall landscape of the political environment remained the same in regard to how
parties behaved. Arriola identifies the desire of African politicians to share in power as one
of the ways in which they are able to bridge cleavages (2012). Senegalese politicians are
pragmatic and joined together to remove Diouf from power despite the fact that the
politicians who formed the winning coalition had different political ideals and little
agreement on policy matters. Rather than having opposition parties based on ideological
grassroots support, many actors in Senegal’s opposition parties use these parties as vehicles
for power, resulting in the voluntary forming and breaking of alliances when convenient
(Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001). Eight candidates ran on the executive ticket in the first round
of the presidential election (Kuenzi, 2011). However, the lack of one single opposition
32

candidate for president was not significant because a majority of voters supported opposition
candidates, forcing the necessity of a runoff second round. This was the first time in
Senegal’s history that a majority of voters supported opposition parties, and it was the only
time in Senegal’s political history that a second round was required in the presidential
election (Vengroff & Magala, 2001). In the first round, Diouf gained 41 per cent of the vote,
and Wade gained 31 per cent of the vote, moving both of them to the second round (Vengroff
and Magala, 2011). The 2000 election was also notable because “the degree of cooperation
manifested by members of the opposition in this election was higher than in any other since
the commencement of full multipartyism in 1981” (Kuenzi, 2011: 37). The political climate
that allowed the opposition to be competitive in the presidential election of 2000, supported
by the pragmatism of the opposition politicians who sought power and the removal of Diouf,
resulted in the successful win of the opposition coalition.
b) Why did the multiethnic coalitions fall apart in both countries?
Coalition failure in Kenya
The National Rainbow Coalition was short-lived. The adornment of the
Memorandum of Understanding which had joined the parties together, the weakness of the
coalition based on unbounded politics and an increasing propensity toward centralized rule
by President Kibaki resulted in the demise of the coalition.
The Memorandum of Understanding that had been signed between the LDP and the
NPK forming the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 was quickly abandoned by
Kibaki once he assumed the role of president (Githongo, 2010; Lynch, 2011; Steeves, 2006;
Barkan, 2004). When forming the Memorandum of Understanding, there was an
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understanding that Raila Odinga would be appointed as Prime Minister—a position that
would be created specifically for him. This was part of the agreement between Odinga and
Kibaki to ensure that there would be benefits for Odinga supporting Kibaki. However, once
the NARC won the election and Kibaki became acting president, Kibaki and his supporting
politicians said that creating such a position would create political instability by creating two
spheres of central power (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006). This was one of the major ways that
the Memorandum of Understanding was completely abandoned by Kibaki. Although Raila
Odinga was not given the position of power that he had been promised, he remained a part of
the coalition government until 2005 when the multiethnic coalition government dissolved
(Githongo, 2010). Tensions between Odinga’s Luo supporters and Kibaki’s Kikuyu
supporters that resulted from the abandonment of the Memorandum of Understanding would
remain a constant issue during the lifetime of the coalition, and even after its end.
Beyond simply abandoning the Memorandum of Understanding upon which the
multiethnic opposition coalition was based, there were structural issues with the coalition.
The foundation of the coalition was not strong enough to maintain the pressures that it would
face when put into practice. Politics of convenience guided the formation of the coalition
prior to the 2002 election. The NAK and LDP joined together with the purpose of opposing
and removing KANU from power (Lynch, 2011). Unbounded politics as noted earlier, was
helpful in forming the coalition (2006: 197). However, unbounded politics became more
problematic when the coalition was active in government. Due to the fluidity of unbounded
politics and politics of convenience, the multiethnic coalition government that was formed in
Kenya was able to bridge ethnic cleavages, but not stabilize itself. The fact that these parties
came together simply to share power and did not have strong ideological similarities, and in
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fact shared more differences than similarities, made it no surprise that the multiethnic
coalition did not stay united. Kibaki’s abandonment of the Memorandum of Understanding
was evidence of the flaw of unbounded politics in forming coalitions of convenience. Once
he was elected as president, there was nothing holding him accountable. Even the
Memorandum of Understanding was simply an agreement between the two parties, there
were no legal ramifications for deserting it once in power (Githongo, 2010; Barkan, 2004).
Once the Memorandum of Understanding was abandoned by Kibaki and his
supporters, the whole façade of the multiethnic opposition coalition shattered. The ethnically
inclusive image of the government dissolved for the public. What had been a coalition of all
major ethnic groups, minus Moi’s Kalenjin group, became a Kikuyu dominated government.
The Kikuyu gained benefits under Kibaki’s leadership and the administration was unfriendly
to the poor. Due to the faction that resulted from the abandonment of the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Luo and Kikuyu supporters of Odinga and Kibaki, leaders under
the regime began to partake in further promoting this ethnic division. These leaders began to
take part in ethnic hysteria, openly speaking out against the hazards of a country under Luo
rule (Githongo, 2010). Ethnicity played a definite role in the dissolution of the 2002 coalition
government. In the formation of the coalition, ethnicity had been an important factor in terms
of strategizing to gain a broad enough constituency base to beat out the power of the KANU
and their Kikuyu majority. However, it is notable that these ethnic groups only came together
for the purpose of gaining votes and were ethnically based parties with little in common
(Steeves, 2006). While ethnicity was the tool of choice utilized by politicians to remove Moi
from power, it created a superficial combination of ethnic groups, which led to the demise of
the coalition when bigger governing issues came to the surface.
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Even with Kibaki’s dissolution of the Memorandum of Understanding and ethnic
hysteria, Odinga remained part of the NARC government. The two publicly espoused their
issues with one another. While Kibaki warned of a Luo led country, notable because of
Odinga’s Luo identity, Odinga openly discussed the “Kikuyu arrogance, greed, and
dishonesty [that] were on display everywhere” (Githongo, 2010, p. 4). However, despite the
antagonism of one another, Odinga remained a crucial part of the political elite. The 2005
constitutional referendum was the ultimate demise of what could still very loosely be defined
as a partnership between Kibaki and Odinga.
The NARC made many promises to the public when running for office, both for the
executive and legislative positions. Mainly, Kibaki had promised to create a constitutional
referendum to lessen the power of the executive. Moi had been known for personalized rule,
and the reason that the opposition initially coalesced and the reason that this coalition had
public support was for the purpose of ending such personalized rule. However, once Kibaki
entered office he fell prey to the powers of the position, because at this time, the executive
title still held an immense amount of power. At least under Moi there had been a successful,
far-reaching neopatrimonial network of clientelism under which each ethnic group gained at
least a small amount of benefit. Under Kibaki the focus was purely on the Kikuyu population
and the ethnic groups of his strongest allies (Githongo, 2010). This did not bode well for the
new administration in terms of public support, because comparatively it made Moi’s
administration look ethnically inclusive. The deep-rooted problem of ethnicity being a zerosum game became a huge issue for Kibaki’s administration.
Eventually a constitutional referendum was held in 2005, but with dire consequences
for Kibaki and his allies, as well as the multiethnic coalition government of the NARC
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(Githongo, 2010; Lynch, 2011). The public was to vote on the constitutional referendum,
called the Wako Draft. Symbols were used to illustrate support and rejection of the draft. A
banana symbolized support of the draft, which Kibaki promoted, and an orange symbolized
rejection of the draft, which Odinga promoted. Although the Electoral Commission of Kenya
(ECK) did not allow campaigning for either side until a little more than a month before the
vote was to take place on November 21, 2005, both sides disregarded this rule. Kibaki and
Odinga traveled the country eating and distributing bananas and oranges (Lynch, 2011: 233).
Odinga not only campaigned against the constitution, he utilized the public’s distrust of
Kibaki and their anger at the president unfairly favoring the Kikuyu to gain support. The
referendum lost, 58 percent in dissent to 42 percent in support. Following the loss, Kibaki
dissolved his entire cabinet of all previous multiethnic ministers, including Odinga, finally
ending the multiethnic coalition government of the NARC (Githongo, 2010). The multiethnic
opposition coalition that formed was successful at gaining power, but not stabilizing it, and
ultimately did not result in a resolution of underlying issues with ethnic cleavages. The
inability to resolve ethnic cleavages along with the weakness of the coalition itself and
Kibaki’s authoritarian leanings, resulted in the dissolution of the NARC in 2005.
Coalition Failure in Senegal
The Sopi coalition in Senegal faced a similarly grim fate as the NARC coalition in
Kenya. Interestingly, the factors resulting in the demise of the Sopi coalition closely parallel
those in the demise of the NARC. First, the coalition was based on unbounded politics and
weak, and second, President Wade centralized his rule and removed cabinet members. The
end of the Sopi coalition eroded over time, rather than in an official removal of the entire
cabinet at once.
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The coalition government that enabled Senegal’s first alternance of power since
independence was based on forty small opposition parties coming together for the purpose of
removing Diouf from power (Kelly, 2012; Kuenzi, 2011). Notably, the parties that made up
the coalition were not all based on a shared ideology, or platform, but rather united under the
shared identity of the opposition (Kuenzi, 2011). The political tradition of using parties
simply as vehicles of power allowed for the lack of ideological cohesion to be a non-issue
when forming the coalition. Due to the fluidity of parties, it is commonplace in Senegal for
parties to form and break alliances when convenient (Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001).
However, while the coalition was able to form quickly because of rather weak
institutionalization of the party system, this same factor would be problematic for the
coalition. Wade had no problem removing cabinet members, because they were simply
sharing power with him, there was no deeper connection than the agreement to form a
coalition. The number of opposition parties was also too great for a true working coalition,
40 parties could not equally and effectively share power.
Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the Sopi coalition was chosen as the leader of the
opposition because he had won the most support in the first round of the presidential election
(Kuenzi, 2011). The purpose of the opposition was to end the personalized rule that had been
occurring under Diouf, however, once in power, Wade would fall into the very authoritarian
ways he campaigned so vehemently against (Kelley, 2012; Galvan, 2001). While his newly
gained presidential post was considered a democratic transition, it is often the case that “the
expansion of democratic space is the stated objective of the new leaders, it often . . . [gives]
way to a new series of efforts to manipulate the system in their favor and insure their own
hegemony through manipulation of institutional structures” (Bingol &Vengroff, 2012, p.
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105). It did not take long after Wade began acting as sitting president for him to begin to
participate in this pattern of behavior.
Wade’s authoritarian tendencies resulted in the demise of the opposition coalition that
formed to bring him to power, but it would take until 2012 for the public to take enough issue
with his actions to remove him from power. First, Wade manipulated small parties under him
instead of strengthening his own PDS party. As a result of the fluidity of the party system, he
encouraged further expansion of parties. These parties were clearly funded by the state for
the purpose of supporting Wade (Resnick, 2013). Beyond this, he made few changes to what
had become the status quo under Diouf. Wade continued to politicize institutions by giving
patronage to his supporters, filling bureaucratic positions with people of his choosing. The
Constitutional Court was a clear example of this authoritarian method of adjudicating
government positions. Due to the fact that the president hand-picks the justices, the necessary
checks on executive power that the court should provide became void (Kelly, 2012). Wade
became notorious for bullying the press, in what was considered a ‘democratic’ nation, and
supporting his Muslim Sufi Brotherhood, the Mourides in an anti-Catholic movement. If
these actions were not symbolic of his transition from democratic messiah to authoritarian
leader, the actions he took within his own government cabinet were without a doubt enough
to illustrate Wade’s devolution into authoritarianism. President Wade became paranoid about
opposition to his rule. He “went through four prime ministers, removing possible
competitors, even arresting his presumed successor” (Galvan, 2009, p. 493). However,
despite such tendencies toward centralized rule, the public remained hopeful that another
term would allow President Wade to fulfill the promises he made while campaigning for the
2000 presidential election. Wade won the 2007 election, but all fourteen opposition
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candidates contested the election, many of whom had been part of Wade’s government
before it fell apart (Galvan, 2009).
While the coalition fell apart due to Wade’s paranoia and removal of cabinet
members, public sentiment drastically changed between 2007 and 2012. Wade passed a
constitutional referendum in 2001 that limited the presidential term from seven years to five
years, however in 2008 he re-extended the term limit to seven years (Arieff, 2011). However,
he argued that he had not fulfilled his two terms because he made the amendment while in
office, so he ran again in 2012 (Resnick, 2013). With this argument, the public became
increasingly aware that Wade was in office for the sole purpose of maintaining power. He
tried to change the presidential electoral rule that requires 50% or more of the vote in the first
round of the election to prevent a runoff, to 25% of the vote to prevent a runoff election.
Such a change “would have de facto transformed the system from a two-round French style
majoritarian system into a single-round plurality system virtually insuring the victory of the
ruling party (Bingol &Vengroff, 2012, p. 111). Wade also wanted to create the position of
vice president, which was taken to symbolize his hope that his son Karim would fill the
position and be his successor (Galvan, 2009). There was backlash against such actions, with
people accusing Wade of cronyism and corruption (Arieff, 2011). It took time, but the public
finally saw Wade as power-hungry, something the elite had recognized prior to 2007, when
they had been removed from their government positions by Wade.
The sheer number of parties involved in the coalition was problematic, but not as
problematic as the weakness of the coalition based on unbounded politics. This weak
coalition combined with the centralized rule of President Wade, resulted in a coalition that
slowly fell apart as issues arose and Wade became paranoid.
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c) Why did the election of 2007 result in violence in Kenya and not Senegal?
Kenya’s 2007 elections ensued in ethnic violence on a grand scale, whereas Senegal’s
2007 election did not. Both coalitions ended prior to the 2007 election, with similar causes as
to their demise. But in Kenya, the election resulted in 1,500 people dead and hundreds of
thousands displaced (Juma, 2009). Alternatively, Senegal remained peaceful and even kept
President Wade in power, re-electing him as executive (Galvan, 2009). Why is this? Kenya
and Senegal share many similarities, but why could one country have horrendous violence
that required peacekeeping by the AU and one retain its dwindling democracy?
First, one must examine the similarities between Kenya and Senegal leading up to the
2007 executive elections. Both countries achieved independence in the early 1960s. Kenya
became independent of British rule in 1963, when elections took place putting Jomo
Kenyatta in power under the one-party rule of the KANU. (Barkan, 2004). Senegal attained
independence from French colonial rule in 1960, when Leopold Senghor was elected
president under the UPS party which later transitioned to the PS (Hartmann, 2010). Of
course, as is the case in one-party states, both Kenyatta and Senghor oppressed opposition
sentiments. In Kenya, Kenyatta ruled from 1963-1978 when he died and was succeeded by
President Moi (Barkan 2004, Hartmann, 2010). In Senegal, Senghor stepped down after 20
years in 1980, when President Diouf succeeded him (Thioub et al., 1998). Kenya introduced
multiparty elections in 1982 (Mueller, 2011), and Senegal introduced multiparty elections in
1976, although limiting it to three official parties (Hartmann, 2010). Liberalization efforts
took place in both Kenya and Senegal in the 1990s (Arriola, 2012). Interestingly, while the
KANU was losing electoral strength in Kenya before the 2002 election (Steeves, 2006;
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Elischer, 2008), the PS was losing electoral strength in Senegal leading up to the election of
the new millennium (Galvan, 2001).
The similarities between Kenya and Senegal continued past the democratic alternance of
power in both nations. In Kenya, Moi participated in centralized rule, which was the basis for
the unification of the opposition. This unified opposition resulted in a multiethnic coalition
(Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006). The same was true of Diouf in Senegal, where the main goal
of the opposition coalition was to end his centralized rule (Kuenzi, 2011; Galvan, 2011).
Once Mwai Kibaki was elected president as part of a multiethnic opposition coalition in
Kenya, he began to act in an authoritarian fashion, causing issues within his own coalition
government. Kibaki had run on democratic promises of change and prosperity, but this came
to a halt once he entered office. He removed officials he deemed a threat to his power, and
ultimately dissolved his multiethnic coalition over a disagreement on a constitutional
referendum, under which he wanted to maintain the strength of the executive (Steeves, 2006).
In Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade was also elected president as part of a multiethnic opposition
coalition, and began to partake in centralizing the power of the executive. He too, had
campaigned on the premise of change, in fact Sopi means “change” in Wolof, which was the
slogan of his campaign. Wade also, removed politicians he deemed as a threat to his power,
and participated in patronage and corruption (Galvan, 2001). In short, the paths Kenya and
Senegal took from independence to the 2007 are strikingly similar.
However, one important factor has not been considered in this examination of similarities
between Kenya and Senegal, and that is the issue of ethnicity. Kenya has five major ethnic
groups that make up approximately 72% of the population (Klopp & Kamungi, 2007).
Senegal also has five main ethnic groups, but they comprise approximately 86% of the
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population (Kuenzi, 2011). Referencing back to the literature discussed in the theories of
ethnicity, Kenya and Senegal differ in regard to what influenced whether or not ethnicity was
mobilized in each respective country. In Kenya, it appears as though the mobilization of
ethnicity followed the historical explanation provided by Basedau et al. (2011). In this
explanation of the mobilization of ethnicity, the authors postulate that when ethnicity has
been previously mobilized and experienced positive results, it is likely that a trend will
emerge where ethnicity continues to be mobilized (Basedau, 2011). Ethnicity was mobilized
effectively by President Moi in the 1990s when he was able to turn ethnic groups against
each other in order to fragment the opposition enough to secure the victory of his party
(Barkan 2011).
Table 1
Kenya
Survey Questions

Ethnic group's economic

Senegal

2005

2008

2005

2008

% of

% of

% of

% of

respondents

respondents

respondents

respondents

45.2

47.6

13.5

22.5

40.2

38.4

15.2

36.3

35.8

32.1

10.8

12.4

conditions worse or much worse
Ethnic group's political influence
less or much less
Ethnic group treated unfairly often
or always
Source: Afrobarometer (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-am/kenya) and (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-n-z/senegal)
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The history of the mobilization of ethnicity in Senegal follows a much different trajectory
than in Kenya. Senegal appears to follow the institutional explanation provided by Basedau
et al. (2011) under which it is theorized that institutional barriers to ethnicity prevent the
emergence of politicized ethnicity. Senegal does indeed have party bans (Hartmann, 2010),
and ethnicity is not a cleavage on which politicians mobilize voters, which seems to provide
backing to this argument. However, Hartmann (2010) suggests that the party bans were put in
place because they were indicative of the overall political culture, which never considered
ethnicity an issue. Galvan (2001) argues that ethnicity has never been a salient issue in
Senegal because of the vibrant civil society that acts to prevent political elites from
mobilizing along ethnic lines. While both of these arguments are valid, the data in Table 1
derived from Afrobarometer suggests that ethnicity is more significant to Senegalese
citizens’ personal feelings than the classic literature on Senegal would suggest. The
percentages for Senegalese respondents in 2008 who feel that their ethnic group has less or
much less political influence than other ethnic groups almost match up with the Kenyan
responses from 2008, which is striking. However, also in 2008, the rates for feeling that
one’s ethnic group was economically disadvantaged show that ethnicity is much less of an
issue in Senegal than in Kenya. In Senegal, nearly 14% said their ethnic group was
economically disadvantaged, while in Kenya over 45% of respondents stated the same thing.
The disparity between these response rates illustrates that ethnicity is more salient and more
of an issue in Kenya than in Senegal.
Despite the data on Senegal from Afrobarometer in Table 1 that shows that ethnicity
may be slightly salient in Senegal, Kenya still undoubtedly has a greater connection to ethnic
identities. Kenya has ethnic parties (Steeves, 06; Elischer, 2008) whereas Senegal does not.
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The similarities between the behavior of the ethnic parties and theories on ethnicity are
notable. Basedau et al. (2011) propose that ethnicity is used as an instrument for gaining
power, proposing that ethnic identities are strengthened in the presence of competitive
elections. This is undoubtedly true in Kenya, where all parties are ethnic parties (Barkan,
2011; Resnick, 2013). In the case of the 2007 election, the election was a Luo-Kikuyu battle
for executive power (Juma, 2009). The violence that erupted follows the theory of ethnic
outbidding which says that once ethnicity is politicized, people will mobilize along ethnic
lines because they believe that whichever candidate wins the executive will unfairly allocate
resources to their own ethnic group at the cost of other ethnic groups (Chandra, 2005;
Arriola, 2012).
This zero-sum game mentality matches with the violence that erupted following the
results of the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. Both sides erupted in ethnic violence
against each other, but the term coined for the violence was “41 against 1” symbolizing that
all ethnic groups were against the Kikuyu (Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009, p. 5). The Kikuyu
had historically been in power under Kenyatta, and there were conflicts before choosing
Kibaki in 2000 because of the Kikuyu tradition of power (Resnick, 2013). The zero-sum
game mentality was in full force during the 2008 violence. Kibaki blatantly favored the
Kikuyu in his first term, resulting in great animosity from the other ethnic groups. As can be
seen in Table 1, respondents from Kenya had large percentages of people feeling that their
ethnic group was economically, politically and socially disadvantaged, both before and after
the violence. Strikingly, the numbers did not increase in 2008 after ethnic violence,
suggesting that ethnicity was not as salient of an issue following the elections (as theory
would suggest) and peacekeeping efforts were an effective strategy to ending ethnic tensions.
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Table 2

Survey Questions

ar political intimidation or violence a lot or somewhat
e use of violence is sometimes necessary in politics

2011
% of respondents
56.5
13.9

Kenya
2008
2005
% of respondents % of respondents
38.0
N/A
25.0
20.7

2003
% of respondents
N/A
17.9

Senegal
Survey Questions

ar political intimidation or violence a lot or somewhat
e use of violence is sometimes necessary in politics

2013
% of respondents
44.4
13.0

2008
% of respondents
27.5
N/A

2005
% of respondents
N/A
9.3

2002
% of respondents
N/A
17.7

Source: Afrobarometer (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-am/kenya) and (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-n-z/senegal)
In 2008 Kenyan politicians called on their own ethnic youth to fight (Githongo, 2010;
Kagwanja 2005). One theory is that gang violence became institutionalized during Moi’s
regime, when he practiced ethnic violence, leaving the gangs waiting to be tapped (Mueller,
2011). In Table 2, nearly a quarter of respondents in Kenya in 2008 believed that violence
was sometimes necessary in politics. This is a high number considering the ethnic political
violence that erupted in 2008, although the number did drop in 2011, suggesting that perhaps
people saw the negative consequences of political violence as too extreme. In both 2008 and
2011, large percentages of respondents were scared of political violence or intimidation. In
2000, 38% of respondents replied with fear of political violence and 56% in 2011. The fact
that politicians from both sides were implicated in the violence but remained in power
suggests that violence has become an accepted part of the political process in Kenya
(Githongo, 2010; Mueller, 2011). The survey results from Afrobarometer provide support to
this statement, while showing that violence is still an issue in Senegal, but to a lesser degree.
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In 2003 and 2012/2013 respectively, the rates of respondents who believed violence should
sometimes be used in politics was nearly the same in Senegal and Kenya. However, in 2005
the Kenyan responses were noticeably higher. This is interesting considering the political
climate of Kenya in 2005 with the constitutional referendum movement, and the reemergence of ethnic tensions.
The causal hypothesis formulated from this research is that the causal mechanisms at play
in Kenya but absent in Senegal are zero-sum ethnic politics and institutionalized violence.
These factors are the two predominant differences in the political environment of Kenya and
Senegal, because as aforementioned, the two states share numerous similarities. Ethnicity is
not entirely absent in Senegal, but the absence of politicized ethnic parties has prevented the
ethnic outbidding that has occurred in Kenya. This ethnic outbidding seems to be largely
responsible for the ethnic violence of 2008. It also appears that the lack of institutionalized
violence relates to the absence of politicized ethnicity in Senegal. In Kenya, President Moi
institutionalized violence along ethnic lines (Mueller, 2011), but in Senegal Diouf did not
have this cleavage upon which to mobilize, so violence remained minor. While there is minor
violence in Senegal, it is looked upon negatively, and is not instigated by the executive
(Resnick, 2013). Ultimately, the lack of politicized ethnic salience in Senegal is what has
kept the country peaceful despite having an extremely similar political track record to Kenya.
VII.

Conclusion

There has been much study of multiethnic coalitions, and of ethnic violence, but there is a
dearth of research in the comparative literature about what causal mechanisms relate
multiethnic coalition success or failure to the emergence of violence, or lack thereof. This
research analysis proposes that politicized ethnicity can be used to institutionalize violence,
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as was the case in Kenya. Further research needs to be conducted into the relationship
between politicized ethnicity and the institutionalization of violence, which could help
multiethnic communities and policy makers in their management of multiethnic issues.
Following the lead of this research, further research also needs to be conducted into the
relationship between a lack of politicized ethnicity and a lack of institutionalized violence to
determine if this is a pattern or if Senegal is unique. The results found by compiling
Afrobarometer survey data in Senegal also warrant further investigation. Excluding the
Casamance region in Senegal, scholarly literature as a whole follows the consensus that
ethnicity is not salient because it is a non-issue, politically. The data from Afrobarometer
surveys illustrates that ethnicity may be salient to one’s personal identity, but it is not salient
in the public realm likely because it has not been politicized. It would be worth studying
whether or not ethnicity does matter in one’s personal life in Senegal, and if it does, how
people are able to keep it separate from political issues.
By examining Kenya and Senegal, this research postulates that politicized ethnicity and
institutionalized violence are two causal factors of the post-election ethnic violence in Kenya,
and their absence relates to the peace in Senegal. If further study could solidify these findings
with empirical evidence on a wider scale than two countries, then the larger community
could use these factors to examine how to prevent further violence in African states. Beyond
that, it is clear from this research that African states need to further institutionalize their
political systems to prevent the fluidity of parties that results in short-lived multiethnic
opposition coalitions. Europe has stable parties with strong ideologies, and the coalitions that
form are much stronger than the multiethnic coalitions that formed in Kenya and Senegal.
For example, Switzerland is known for being a multiethnic state with peaceful executive
48

power-sharing in broad coalitions (Ljiphart, 1999). Democratization success may also need
to be revisited in Kenya and Senegal because both of these nations were deemed democratic,
although once in power, the presidents partook in authoritarian actions. Other scholars should
attempt to find a way to prevent centralized rule in Africa while simultaneously
strengthening the party system, otherwise if countries follow the paths of Kenya and Senegal,
the process of democratization will never be complete because of the executive.
The need for further research comes from the limitations of this research. By using the
most similar systems design, the number of cases available was limited. Two cases is a very
small sample and limits the scope of how far the causal hypotheses can be generalized to
other countries. Also, identifying causal mechanisms only allows for the generation of causal
hypotheses, not conclusions. So, this research is simply the start of the process of identifying
the deeper relationships between ethnicity, multiethnic coalitions and violence. In order to
further delve into the topic of this thesis, it would be necessary to do a larger study. Doing a
larger study with multiple cases would allow one to perform quantitative analysis and
examine the relationships between the variables of interest and rule out rival hypotheses
through the inclusion of statistical controls. The first stage of a larger study would likely use
African states because of their regional similarities, however, one would eventually want to
use a research design that included cases from other regions to test these hypotheses and
evaluate the external validity of any findings emanating from the study of just African cases.
This thesis provides the groundwork for such further research.
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